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Abstract: Quantum key distribution (QKD) can help two distant peers to share secret key bits,
whose security is guaranteed by the law of physics. In practice, the secret key rate of a QKD
protocol is always lowered with the increasing of channel distance, which severely limits the
applications of QKD. Recently, twin-field (TF) QKD has been proposed and intensively studied,
since it can beat the rate-distance limit and greatly increase the achievable distance of QKD.
Remarkalebly, K. Maeda et. al. proposed a simple finite-key analysis for TF-QKD based on
operator dominance condition. Although they showed that their method is sufficient to beat the
rate-distance limit, their operator dominance condition is not general, i.e. it can be only applied
in three decoy states scenarios, which implies that its key rate cannot be increased by introducing
more decoy states, and also cannot reach the asymptotic bound even in case of preparing infinite
decoy states and optical pulses. Here, to bridge this gap, we propose an improved finite-key
analysis of TF-QKD through devising new operator dominance condition. We show that by
adding the number of decoy states, the secret key rate can be furtherly improved and approach
the asymptotic bound. Our theory can be directly used in TF-QKD experiment to obtain higher
secret key rate. Our results can be directly used in experiments to obtain higher key rates.
© 2020 Optical Society of America under the terms of the OSA Open Access Publishing Agreement
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2] provides two distant parties (Alice and Bob) a secret string
of random bits against any eavesdropper (Eve), who may have unlimited power of computing
but is just assumed to obey the law of quantum mechanics [3, 4]. During last three decades,
QKD has been developed rapidly both in theory and experiment. In theory, the security of
QKD is thoroughly analyzed [3], while a variety of novel protocols, e.g. decoy states [5–7] and
measurement-device-independent (MDI) protocol [8], are proposed. In experiment, it is on the
way to a wide range of QKD networks [9,10], even a satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution
has been realized [11]. Among all these above mentioned QKD protocols and experiments, there
are some fundamental limits [12, 13] on the secret key rate versus channel distance. For instance,
Pirandola-Laurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) bound R 6 −log2(1 − η) [13] gives the precise
limit on the secret key rate R under a given channel transmittance η for any repeaterless QKD
protocols.
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To surpass the PLOB bound, a possible way is to introduce at least one middle node in the
protocol. However, this is not a sufficient condition, i.e. the original MDI-QKD protocol does
have a middle node but is still unable to beat the PLOB bound. Indeed, some extensions of
MDI-QKD can improve its rate scaling from η to √η by either using quantum memories [14, 15]
or quantum non-demolition measurement [16]. Albeit these setups can be considered to be the
simplest examples of quantum repeaters [17, 18] which are the ultimate solution to trust-free
long-distance quantum communications [19], quantum memories or quantum non-demolition
measurement is quite challenging at present.
Remarkablely, twin-field (TF) QKD protocol, proposed by Lucamarini et al. [20], is capable
of overcoming PLOB bound without needing quantum memories or quantum non-demolition
measurement. TF-QKD, known as a variant of MDI-QKD [8], uses single-photon click to
generate key bit rather than two-photon click in the original MDI-QKD, which is critical for its
advantage of beating PLOB bound. Inspired by this dramatic breakthrough, some variants of
TF-QKD have been proposed consequentially [21–26], and some realizations [27–31] have been
reported.
In Refs. [23–25], authors independently proposed a variant of TF-QKD featuring simpler
process and higher key rate, since phase postselection is removed. For simplicity, we call
this protocol No-phase-post selection(NPP) TF-QKD in the remainder of the paper. The
original papers on NPP-TFQKD [23–25] gave security proof based on different methods, but
a finite-key analysis was missing. Later, some proofs of NPP-TFQKD on finite-key scenario
are proposed [32, 33]. Remarkably, K.Maeda et. al. proposed a simple finite-key analysis for
NPP-TFQKD based on operator dominance condition [32]. Their method is sufficient to beat
the rate-distance limit when the amount of pulses in the signal mode sent by Alice and Bob
reaches 1012, which is much smaller than the result obtained in Ref. [33]. However, their operator
dominance condition is not general which can be only applied in three decoy states scenarios.
Hence, one cannot increase its key rate by introducing more decoy states. In this work, inspired
by the idea of operator inequality, we propose another operator inequality condition which can
be applied to any number of decoy states scenarios. This leads to a higher key rate than that
of [32]. In section I, we briefly review the flow of NPP-TFQKD and the idea of using operator
dominance condition to analyze its security, then propose a new operator inequality. In section II,
we present a new operator inequality and a virtual protocol whose security is naturally based on
the proposed operator inequality. In section III, we convert the virtual protocol into an actual
protocol which is practical in real-life, and a simulation in finite-key case is given then. Finally a
conclusion is present.
2. operator dominance condition and virtual protocol
The flow of NPP-TFQKD is sketched in Fig 1. In order to share security key, Alice and Bob both
send optical pulses to Charlie, who controls the untrusted central station. Both of Alice and Bob
randomly switch among code mode and test mode independently. They use code mode to share
keys and test mode to estimate the potential information leakage.
In the code mode, Alice and Bob randomly applying 0 or pi phase shifting to the weak coherent
state |√µ〉. Then they send the pulses to Charlie who measures and announces whether these
two quantum states are in-phase or anti-phase when the detection is successful. Bob flips his
bit when anti-phase was announced. By this way, they can share random bits. In the test
mode, both of the senders randomize the optical phase θ and switch among several intensities
{µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, · · · , µk}. They use these phase-randomized coherent states to monitor the amount
of information leakage. There are two ways to estimate and generate secret key bits. The first way
is to directly calculate Eve’s information which is limited by Holevo bound, just like Refs. [26,33].
The other way is calculating the phase error in an equivalent protocol where Alice and Bob
introduce auxiliary qubits A and B, just like Refs [23,25,32]. It seems that the latter one is better
Fig. 1. Illustration of NPP-TFQKD protocol, Alice and Bob generate their raw key from
the rounds in which they both select the code mode and Charlie declares a successful
detection . They encode their key bits in the phase of their coherent states. When the
coherent states are in-phase (anti-phase), Charlie’s 50:50 beam splitter interference
should cause a click in left(right) detector. Theses phase-randomized coherent states in
the test mode are only used to monitor the amount of leak.
when finite-key effect is considered. Thus, we follow the latter way and introduce the virtual
protocol used here.
Alice and Bob’s procedure in each trial of the code mode is equivalently implemented by
preparing the following joint quantum state
( |0〉A |
√
µ〉CA + |1〉A | −
√
µ〉CA√
2
) ⊗ ( |0〉B |
√
µ〉CB + |1〉B | −
√
µ〉CB√
2
),
where {|0〉, |1〉} denotes the qubit in Z basis, and CA(CB) denotes the optical pulse sent by
Alice(Bob). Alice and Bob retain the pairs of A and B in case of Charlie announcing a successful
detection. When the number of successful detection is sufficiently large, Alice and Bob measure
the qubits A and B in the Z basis to collect sifted key bits. In order to know the information
leakage, we have to estimate the phase error rate in Z basis which is equal to the bit error rate in
X basis instead of Z basis. This corresponds to the pair in either state |+〉|−〉 or |−〉|+〉 where
{|±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2} denote the qubit in X basis. Hence, the key point is that how we estimate
the bit error rate if Alice and Bob virtually measure the retained pairs of A and B with X basis.
Supposing that Alice and Bob make the X basis measurement before sending out the optical
pulses, we can rewrite the joint quantum state as
(√c+ |+〉A |√µeven〉CA +
√
c− |−〉A |√µodd〉CA ) ⊗ (
√
c− |+〉B |√µodd〉CB +
√
c+ |−〉B |√µevenCB ), (1)
where c+ = e−µcoshµ and c− = e−µsinhµ. The state |√µeven〉 = (|√µ〉+ | −√µ〉)/2√c− consists
of even photon numbers, and the state |√µodd〉 = (|√µ〉 − | − √µ〉)/2√c− consists of odd photon
numbers. After tracing out the qubits A and B, we can find that
ρCACB = pevenρeven + poddρodd . (2)
Here peven = c2+ + c2− = e−2µ cosh 2µ and the quantum state ρeven reads
pevenρeven = c2+ |
√
µeven
√
µeven〉〈
√
µeven
√
µeven | + c2− |
√
µodd
√
µodd〉〈
√
µodd
√
µodd |, (3)
where podd = 1 − peven and the quantum state ρodd reads
poddρodd = c+c− |√µeven
√
µodd〉〈
√
µeven
√
µodd | + c−c+ |
√
µodd
√
µeven〉〈
√
µodd
√
µeven |.
Evidently, if Alice and Bob are able to prepare ρeven and ρodd , the security of NPP-TFQKD
will be completely equivalent to the original MDI-QKD with single photon source, and then
some previous security analyses in finite-key case can be adapted conveniently. However, ρeven
and ρodd are non-classical optical pulses, which are impossible to prepare with off-the-shelf
devices. The essential contribution of Ref. [32] is finding an efficient way to approximate ρeven
just by using some phase-randomized coherent states. Specifically, they proposed an operator
dominance condition which reads
p20τ(0) + p21τ(µ1) − Γτ(µ2) ≥ Λρeven .
Here, p2τ(µ) = p2 ∑n,m µn+me−2µn!m! |n〉〈n| ⊗ |m〉〈m| corresponds to the joint quantum state in
case of Alice and Bob both preparing phase-randomized weak coherent pulses with mean
photon-number µ, and the corresponding probability is p2. This operator inequality implies that
Alice and Bob’s joint phase-randomized weak coherent state can be reinterpreted as a mixture of
ρeven, weak coherent states with a different intensity, and some "junk" states. Hence, it’s possible
to bound the yield of ρeven just through preparing phase-randomized weak coherent states with
three intensities. However, this inequality is not tight and cannot improved by introducing 4 or
more intensities.
Intuitively, ρeven is just related to the Fock states whose the total photon-number emitted by
Alice and Bob is even, thus it is reasonable to devise operator dominance condition with just
these even photon-number states. Based on this consideration, we propose another operator
dominance condition which reads
p20τµ0,even + p
2
1τµ1,even − Γτµ2,even ≥ Λρeven, (4)
where the quantum state τµ,even =
∑∞
k=0
∑2k
j=0
µ2ke−2µ
j!(2k−j)! | j〉〈 j | ⊗ |2k − j〉〈2k − j | corresponds to
Alice and Bob’s joint phase-randomized weak coherent state with all odd total photon number
states eliminated. The proof of this operator inequality is given in Appendix A.
To analyze the security of NPP-TFQKD with the proposed operator inequality, we employ the
following virtual protocol, whose security can be proved by Eq (4) easily.
Step 1: Alice andBob choose a label from label set {”code”, ”0even”, ”0odd”, ”1even”, ”1odd”, ”2even”, ”2odd”}
with probability p2c, p20pµ0,even, p
2
0pµ0,odd, p
2
1pµ1,even, p
2
1pµ1,odd, p
2
2pµ2,even, p
2
2pµ2,odd, respec-
tively. According to the label, they perform one of the following procedures.
"code": Alice and Bob generate random key bits x and y, send weak coherent states |(−1)x√µ〉
and |(−1)y√µ〉 to Charlie, respectively.
"0even": Alice and Bob send a joint quantum state τµ0,even to Charlie.
"0odd": Alice and Bob send a joint quantum state τµ0,odd to Charlie.
"1even": Alice and Bob send a joint quantum state τµ1,even to Charlie.
"1odd": Alice and Bob send a joint quantum state τµ1,odd to Charlie.
"2even": Alice and Bob send a joint quantum state τµ2,even to Charlie.
"2odd": Alice and Bob send a joint quantum state τµ2,odd to Charlie.
Here, the variable pµ,even = e−2µ cosh 2µ (pµ,odd = e−2µ sinh 2µ ) denotes that the proportion
of τµ,even (τµ,odd) in τ(µ).
Step 2: Alice and Bob repeat Step 1 for Ntot times.
Step 3: Charlie receives the incoming pairs of optical pulses, and announces whether the
phase difference was successfully detected for each pair he received. For successful detection, he
also announces it was in-phase or anti-phase.
Step 4: Let γc be the number of detected rounds for which both Alice and Bob select la-
bel "code". Alice concatenates the random key bits for the γc rounds to define her sifted
key. Bob defines his sifted key in the same way except that he flips all the bits for the rounds
in which Charlie declared anti-phase detection. Let γ0,even, γ0,odd, γ1,even, γ1,odd, γ2,even,
γ2,odd be the number of detected rounds for which both Alice and Bob send the quantum states
τµ0,even, τµ0,odd, τµ1,even, τµ1,odd, τµ2,even, τµ2,odd . Let γsum,even = γ0,even + γ1,even.
Step 5: Alice announces HEC bits of syndrome of a error correction code for her sifted
key to perform key reconcilation. Bob reconciles his sifted key accordingly. Alice and Bob verify
the correction by comparing ζ ′ bits universal2 hashing [34]
Step 6: They apply the privacy amplification to obtain final keys of length
G = γc − (γch( f (γsum,even, γ2,even)/γc)) − HEC − ζ − ζ ′, (5)
where the function h(x) = −xlog2x − (1 − x)log2(1 − x) for x ≤ 1/2 and h(x) = 1 for x>1/2
and ζ is related to the security parameter of secret key bits. The function f (γsum,even, γ2,even)
is essential for the security, since it gives an upper bound of detection number for Alice and
Bob virtually prepare pevenρeven in the γc sifted key generations rounds. Its definition will be
introduced below.
Define γc,even is the exact detection number for Alice and Bob virtually preparing pevenρeven
in the γc sifted key generations rounds, then γc,even/γc is just the phase error rate of sifted key
bits. We construct a function f subjected to
Prob{γc,even ≤ f (γsum,even, γ2,even)} ≥ 1 − , (6)
which means that f bounds γc,even with a failure probability  . According to Ref. [3], we will
know that this formula implies that the virtual protocol is sec-secure where the security parameter
sec =
√
2
√
 + 2−ζ + 2−ζ ′ . Now, we start to construct the function f (γsum,even, γ2,even). Since
Eq.(4) holds, we can safely suppose that
(p20 + p21)τsum,even = Γτµ2,even + Λρeven + ∆ρjunk, (7)
where
(p20 + p21)τsum,even = p20τµ0,even + p21τµ1,even . (8)
We can immediately observe γsum,even, as it is the number of detection rounds that Alice
and Bob prepare the state τsum,even, i.e. τµ0,even or τµ1,even. Besides, since τsum,even is a
mixture of τµ2,even, ρeven and ρjunk , γsum,even is the sum of the numbers of detection rounds
for components τµ2,even, ρeven, and ρjunk , namely γ2′,even, γc′,even, γjunk . Evidently, γ2′,even is
a Bernoulli sampling from a population with γ2′,even + γ2,even, since τµ2,even shares the same
density matrix for the rounds that Alice and Bob choose the label "2even". Similarly, γc,even
is a Bernoulli sampling from a population with γc,even + γc′,even. Since we know the value of
γsum,even and γ2,even, by the use of Chernoff bound, we get an lower bound on γ2′,evenwith a
failure probability 2 . Then, the fact that γsum,even = γ2′,even + γc′,even + γjunk leads to an upper
bound on γc′,even. Finally, by using Chernoff bound again, we get an upper bound on γc,even
with a failure probability less than  . The upper bound reads
f (γsum,even, γ2,even) = p
2
0peven
Λ (γsum,even − Γp22pµ2,even γ2,even (9)
+ν(γsum,even, γ2,even)
√−log(/2)),
where
ν(γsum,even, γ2,even) '
√
2Γ(p22pµ2,even+Γ)
p22pµ2,even
√
γ2,even (10)
+
√
2(1 + Λ
p20pµ2,even
)
√
γsum,even − Γp22pµ2,even γ2,even .
The upper bound f (γsum,even, γ2,even) satisfies
Prob
(
γc,even ≤ f (γsum,even, γ2,even)
) ≥ 1 − ,
which implies that the virtual protocol is sec-secure and sec =
√
2
√
 + 2−ζ + 2−ζ ′ .
3. Actual protocol
We have proved the security of virtual protocol in the last section. However, the above virtual pro-
tocol is not practical, since Alice and Bob can never prepare the quantum state τµ,even and τµ,odd in
practice. Fortunately, what we care about are the yields of τµ,even and τµ,odd , and we note that the
phase randomized coherent state τµ consists of τµ,even and τµ,odd . This implies that one can bound
γsum,even and γ2,even by the idea of decoy states [5–7], albeit we cannot deterministically prepare
τµ,even. Inspired by this consideration, we convert the virtual protocol to an actual protocol below.
Step 1: Alice(Bob) chooses a label from {”code”, ”0”, ”1”, ”2”, · · · , ”k”} with probabilities
pc, p0, p1, p2, · · · , pk respectively. Then, according to the label, Alice(Bob) performs one of the
following procedures.
"code": She(He) generates a randomkey bit x(y) and sends aweak coherent state |(−1)x√µ〉(|(−1)y√µ〉)
to Charlie.
"0": She(He) sends a phase-randomized weak coherent state with intensity µ0 to Charlie.
"1": She(He) sends a phase-randomized weak coherent state with intensity µ1 to Charlie.
"2": She(He) sends a phase-randomized weak coherent state with intensity µ2 to Charlie.
...
"k": She(He) sends a phase-randomized weak coherent state with intensity µk to Charlie.
Step 2: Alice and Bob repeat Steps 1 for Ntot times.
Step 3: Charlie receives the incoming pairs of optical pulses, and announces whether the
phase difference was successfully detected for each pair he received. For successful detections,
he also announces it was in-phase or anti-phase.
Step 4: Alice and Bob disclose their label choices. Let γc be the number of detected rounds
for which both Alice and Bob select label "code". Alice concatenates the random key bits
for the γc rounds to define her sifted key. Bob defines his sifted key in the same way except
that he flips all the bits for the rounds in which Charlie declared anti-phase detections. Let γi j
be the number of detected rounds for which Alice choose the label "i" and Bob choose the label "j".
Step 5: Alice announces HEC bits of syndrome of a error correction code for her sifted
key to perform key reconcilation. Bob reconciles his sifted key accordingly. Alice and Bob verify
the correction by comparing ζ ′ bits universal2 hashing [34]
Step 6: They apply the privacy amplification to obtain final keys of length
G = γc − (γch( f (γsum,even, γ2,even)/γc)) − HEC − ζ − ζ ′, (11)
where γsum,even denotes the upper bound on γeven and γ2,even denotes the lower bound on
γ2,even. Evidently, Eq.(11) is the same as Eq.(5) except that f (γsum,even, γ2,even) is replaced by
f (γsum,even, γ2,even). Since f (γsum,even, γ2,even) ≥ f (γsum,even, γ2,even), the condition
Prob
(
γc,even ≤ f (γsum,even, γ2,even)
)
≥ 1 − 
holds if both γsum,even and γ2,even are correctly estimated. Furtherly defining an extra failure
probability of estimation of γ2,even and γsum,even as εerr , we conclude that the security parameter
of the actual protocol sec =
√
2
√
 ′ + 2−ζ + 2−ζ ′ and  ′ =  + εerr .
We note that in some security proofs of QKD protocols, virtual protocol is completely as same
as the actual protocol in terms of key bit and EveâĂŹs system. Indeed, we argue that this condition
has been met in our proof. Note that in the virtual protocol defined in the main text, to evaluate
X-basis error rate, Alice and Bob prepare τµ0,even, τµ0,odd, τµ1,even, τµ1,odd, τµ2,even, τµ2,odd with
probabilities p20pµ0,even, p
2
0pµ0,odd, p
2
1pµ1,even, p
2
1pµ1,odd, p
2
2pµ2,even, p
2
2pµ2,even,respectively. For
instance, recall that pµ1,evenτµ1,even + pµ1,oddτµ1,odd = τµ0 ,which means that virtual protocol
can be viewed as preparing phase-randomized coherent state τµ0 . As a result we could describe
the virtual protocol in an equivalent way, i.e. protocol2, which is Alice and Bob preparing
τµ0, τµ1, τµ2with probabilities p20, p
2
1, p
2
2 respectively. From the view of Eve, there is no difference
between virtual protocol and protocol2. And Alice and BobâĂŹs key bits are also same because
the code modes in virtual protocol and protocol2. The only challenge is that Alice and Bob cannot
directly observe the clicks of τµ0,even, τµ0,odd, τµ1,even, τµ1,odd, τµ2,even, τµ2,odd in the protocol2.
Fortunately, we can resort to decoy states, i.e. introducingτµ3, τµ4, · · · Note that by far we
do not assume that p2c + p20 + p
2
1 + p
2
2 = 1. Thus we could assume Alice and Bob additionally
prepare τµ3, τµ4, · · · with probabilities p23, p24, · · · in above virtual protocol and protocol2. Now,
the protocol2 here is just the actual protocol defined in the main text. Introducing τµ3, τµ4, · · · is
obviously useless in the virtual protocol, then we return to the virtual protocol defined in the
main text.
To calculate the final key length, a simplemethod of computing Γ andΛ from (p0, p1, µ, µ0, µ1, µ2)
is given in Appendix A. What’s more, using linear program, one can get γsum,even and γ2,even
with a failure probability no larger than εerr . For simplicity, we just consider how to calculate
γsum,even and γ2,even in the case of four test states whose intensities are {µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3}.
The method of computing γsum,even and γ2,even with linear programming is showed below.
Indeed the variable γsum,even can be written as
γsum,even = γ0,even + γ1,even =,
∞∑
k=0
(
2k∑
j=0
Nµ0µ0
j,2k−j + N
µ1µ1
j,2k−j ), (12)
and the variable γ2,even can be written as
γ2,even ,
∞∑
k=0
2k∑
j=0
Nµ2µ2
j,2k−j (13)
where the variable Nµµ
j,2k−j denote the number of detected events in which the users sent (j,2k-j)
photons and both selected intensity µ. For estimating the upper bound of γsum,even, we divide
this variable into two parts according to the value of k. As for the part where k ≤ 2, which can be
denoted as
∑2
k=0
∑2k
j=0(Nµ0µ0j,2k−j +Nµ1µ1j,2k−j) ,its bound can be calculated with the method in Ref. [35]
Clearly, variables Nµaµb
j,2k−j for any µa, µb ∈ {µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3} provides a random sampling between
each other. Besides, these variables must satisfy the constraints
∑k=2
k=0
∑2k
j=0 N
µaµb
j,2k−j ≤ γa,b. By
these constraints, for the variable
∑2
k=0
∑2k
j=0(Nµ0µ0j,2k−j + Nµ1µ1j,2k−j), one can get its upper bound
using linear programming listed in the Supplementary Note 2 of Ref. [35]. As for the part k ≥ 3,
We use the Eq(34) in Ref. [36] to get the upper bound of it from the the expected number of
transmitted events
∑∞
k=3
∑2k
j=0 Ntot (p20e−2µ0
µ2k0
j!(2k−j)! + p
2
1e
−2µ1 µ2k1
j!(2k−j)! ) As for the estimation of
the lower bound of γ2,even, we also divide it into two parts according to the value of k, for the
part where k ≤ 2, we get its lower with the same method as that of γsum,even, for the part where
k ≥ 3, we set its lower bound as 0. we denote the total failure probability of estimation of
γsum,even and γ2,even as εerr = 2.60e − 20.
Based on the method given above, we simulate the secret key rate G/Ntot as a function of
distance L between Alice and Bob when the total number of test states is four. The parameters
used in simulation are listed below. We set the intensity µ0=5e-4 in the test mode and the
parameters (µ1, µ2, µ3, pc, p0, p1, p2, p3) are optimized for each distance. The simulate result is
listed in table II. Note that we set ζ ′=32 which makes the protocol is cor = 2−32-cor, while setting
ζ = 2−69,  = 2−69 and εerr = 2.60e − 20 make the protocol is sct =
√
2
√
( + εerr ) + 2−ζ -sct.
Finally, all these parameters make the protocol to be sec = cor + sct = 4.6084e − 10-sec. For
comparison, we also simulate the secret key rate of Ref. [32] with the same parameters, and
present the result in table III.
em pd ξ(dB/km) ηd f sec
0.03 10−8 0.2 0.3 1.1 4.6084e-10
Table 1. List of parameters uesd in the numerical simulations. Here, em is loss-
independent misalignment error. pd is dark counting probability. ξ is fiber loss. ηd
denotes detection efficiency. f is error-correction efficiency. sec show that actual
protocol is sec-secure
As shown in table II and III,those key rates in red in table II is higher than those in table III
which show that the secret key rates of our protocol are obviously higher than those of Ref. [32],
if the pulse number Ntot is larger than 1013 or the channel distance is short (typically shorter than
200km), which corresponds to the cases that the length of sifted key bits is large. The main reason
for this is that we need more test states and linear program to estimate more parameters than the
the case in Ref. [32], which leads to our method is more sensitive to statistical fluctuations.
4. conclusion
Inspired by the idea of operator dominance condition, we propose a generalized operator inequality.
Unlike the original one which is only applicable in three decoy states case, the proposed method
allows that Alice and Bob use any number of decoy states in the test mode to improve the secret
pulses
key rate distance
0 km 100 km 200 km 300 km 350 km 400 km
1e11 0.0076 4.2085e-4 4.0147e-6 0 0 0
1e12 0.0093 6.464e-4 1.9735e-5 8.0269e-7 1.6073e-9 0
1e13 0.0110 7.2618e-4 4.3012e-5 5.2706e-6 8.8916e-7 8.5783e-8
1e14 0.0161 8.3757e-4 4.8580e-5 9.3155e-6 1.9658e-6 2.7717e-7
Inf 0.0505 0.0024 1.9992e-4 9.0841e-6 2.9624e-6 1.0456e-6
Table 2. The secret key rate (per pulse) computed by our method. The key rates in red
are higher than the corresponding ones in Table III.
pulses
key rate distance
0 km 100 km 200 km 300 km 350 km 400 km
1e11 0.0032141 2.0931e-4 1.2947e-5 4.8005e-7 3.255e-8 0
1e12 0.003777 2.7426e-4 2.0166e-5 1.0789e-6 1.5406e-7 0
1e13 0.00417 3.236e-4 2.6343e-5 1.6959e-6 3.0752e-7 1.0724e-8
1e14 0.0044309 3.5787e-4 3.0927e-5 2.2078e-6 4.4945e-7 3.0326e-8
Inf 0.0063 8.6679e-4 8.1977e-5 7.2654e-6 8.3271e-7 4.2944e-7
Table 3. The secret key rate (per pulse) computed by the method in Ref. [32].
key rate. Additionally, since the proposed operator inequality consists of even photon-number
states, a more effective approximate of the quantum state ρeven is made. As a result, higher
secret key rate in TF-QKD is obtained in both infinite and finite key regions with considerable
key length. Our method can be directly adapted implementations of TF-QKD.
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Appendix
We construct the operator dominance condition here. Firstly, we give the methods to calculate the
value Γ and Λ from the parameters (µ, µ1, µ2, p0, p10, p11, p2). We choose Γ and Λ subjected to
Γ
p211
=
µ1e−2µ1
µ2e−2µ2
(14)
and
pevenp211
Λ
=
e−2µ
p210e
−2µ0/p211 − e−2µ1 (µ1 − µ2)/µ2
+
e−2µ
µ1e−2µ1
∞∑
k=1
(k + 1)µ2k
µ2k1 − µ2k2
(15)
Additionally, these variables which subjected to
0 <
µ1 − µ2
µ2
<
p210e
−2µ0
p211e
−2µ1 (16)
Next, We will show why Eq (4) holds. We expand the left hand side of Eq (4) on the Fock
basis
∑
k,k′(qk+k′/k!k ′!)|k, k ′〉〈k, k ′ |
qn =
{
p210e
−2µ0 µn0 + p
2
11e
−2µ1 µn1 − Γe−2µ2 µn2 n ≥ 2, n : even
p211e
−2µ1 − Γe−2µ2 + p210e−2µ0 n = 0
(17)
We suppose another variable
q′n =
{
p211e
−2µ1 µn1 − Γe−2µ2 µn2 n ≥ 2, n : even
p211e
−2µ1 − Γe−2µ2 + p210e−2µ0 n = 0
(18)
where qn = q′n = 0 when n = 2k + 1 . For this protocol, we set µ0 as a constant 5e − 4. Hence,
we immediately know that qn ≥ q′n for any n ≥ 0. Given that Eq (14),we get
q′n =
{
p211µ1e
−2µ1 (µn−11 − µn−12 ) ≥ 0 n ≥ 2, n : even
p210e
−2µ0 − p211e−2µ1 (µ1 − µ2)/µ2 > 0 n = 0
(19)
Given that Eq (17) ,Eq (15) can be rewritten as
peven
Λ
=
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)µ2k
q′2k
(20)
Let Πe =
∑∞
k=0 |2k〉〈2k | and Πo =
∑∞
k=0 |2k + 1〉〈2k + 1| be projections to the subspace
with even and odd photon numbers,respectively. We denote Παβ = Πα ⊗ Πβ(α, β = e, o). In
according to Eq (3), We get
pevenρeven = Πee |√µ,√µ〉〈√µ,√µ|Πee + Πoo |√µ,√µ〉〈√µ,√µ|Πoo (21)
Eq(4) is equivalent to the following set of conditions:
peven
∑
k,k′:even
qk+k′
k!k′!
|k, k ′〉〈k, k ′ | ≥ ΛΠee |√µ,√µ〉〈√µ,√µ|Πee (22)
peven
∑
k,k′:odd
qk+k′
k!k′!
|k, k ′〉〈k, k ′ | ≥ ΛΠoo |√µ,√µ〉〈√µ,√µ|Πoo (23)
qk+k′ ≥ 0(k + k ′ : odd). (24)
qk+k′ = 0 when k + k ′ is odd leads to Eq (24) is true. Eq (22) is true if
pevenΠee ≥ Λ|φee〉〈φee | (25)
where
|φee〉 =
∑
k,k′:even
(qk+k′
k!k′!
)−1/2 |k, k ′〉〈k, k ′ |√µ,√µ〉 (26)
It’s easy to know that
〈φee |φee〉 =
∑
k,k′:even
e−2µuk+k′
qk+k′
<
peven
Λ
(27)
According to Eq (27), we know that Eq (25) is true and so is Eq (22). Similarly, for
|φoo〉 =
∑
k,k′:odd
(qk+k′
k!k′!
)|k, k ′〉〈k, k ′ |√µ,√µ〉 (28)
we can konw immediately
〈φoo |φoo〉 = e−2µ
∞∑
k=1
kµ2k
q2k
<
peven
Λ
(29)
This leads to that Eq (23) is true.
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